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Crime and the Seaway
Oliver Schroeder, Jr.
THE ADMINISTRATION of criminal justice involves many
challenges. Who exercises jurisdiction? What crimes are involved?
How shall the prosecution proceed? The manner in which these
questions are resolved determines the peace and order of any com-
munity of men. What answers will be forthcoming will be decided
by that orderly procedure we term justice - a continuous process to
adapt man's laws to meet man's needs. When the life of a com-
munity is radically altered the
administration of justice will
THE AtrrHoR (A.B., 1938, Western Reserve, mirror the changes.
LL.B., 1941, Harvard) is Professor of Law and
Director of the Law-Medicine Center of the HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
School of Law of Western Reserve University.
Seldom has a community
of men, like the Great Lakes
region, been able to consider for such an extended period of time the
major changes which will accompany the dramatic opening of the
Great Lakes to world sea commerce in 1959. The international at-
mosphere of this region began on December 24, 1814, with the
Treaty of Ghent demarking the international boundary between
Great Britain and the United States. The dedication of the Great
Lakes to peaceful international commerce followed rapidly. In April
1817, an agreement between these two nations limited the naval
forces to be bottomed on the lakes. Commerce was stimulated by
the Treaty of Washington, signed in 1842, which provided for free-
dom of navigation. By May 1871, the principle of free navigation
for British and American vessels in the new Welland canal had also
been legally established by treaty.'
The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Deep Waterway Treaty signed
in July 1932, opened the final chapter in realizing the dreams of sev-
eral generations of midwestern Americans and Canadians for a
strategic position on the world's seas to promote peaceful commerce.'
With the fruition of such planning and laboring it now remains for
the people of the Great Lakes community to live in their new environ-
ment. Criminal law will be a part of that living. To understand the
relationship of criminal law to the Seaway several subjects require
study: jurisdiction, comparative analysis of federal and state crimes,
1. The above mentioned treaties are discussed in OGILVIE, INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS
269-70 (1920).
2. HYDE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED BY THE UNITED STATES
575-77 (2d rev. ed. 1947).
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The touchstone of the jurisdiction issue in the Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence Seaway community is the precise overlay of federal juris-
diction upon state jurisdictions. The international boundary roughly
bisecting the great waterway also marks the state boundaries with
the Canadian provinces. Geographically and jurisdictionally the
Great Lakes are both federal and state. The problem is similar to
the land area of the United States, but the waterway presents a more
acute jurisdictional issue than the land area. Two express grants of
authority to the federal government in the United States Constitu-
tion have sharpened this issue:
1. The Congress shall have power . . to define and punish piracies
and felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of na-
tions.3
2. The judicial power shall extend ... to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.4
These powers have been interpreted to be independent without limi-
tation. The clauses also represent the transfer of admiralty juris-
diction to the national government, which jurisdiction had reposed
in the states and the Confederation prior to 1789.' Federal criminal
jurisdiction is exercised generally to enforce laws enacted under the
specific grants of authority in article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
Specific authority for criminal legislation arises from the adoption of
constitutional amendments such as amendment XIV. General crimes
- homicide, burglary, robbery, arson, or rape - are introduced
through congressional authority to define felonies on the high seas
or to define crimes in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The
judicial authority of article III, section 2 has been the primary source
of federal criminal laws for the Great Lakes.
Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction
Over a century ago Mr. Chief justice Taney writing for the major-
ity upheld congressional power to extend the maritime jurisdiction to
all public navigable lakes and rivers where commerce occurs between
different states or with a foreign nation. Specifically, in The Genessee
Chief,6 the Court upheld the constitutionality of an act of Congress
3. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
4. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
5. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
6. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
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which extended the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to a
civil case involving a collision between two vessels on Lake Ontario.
Although English admiralty jurisdiction was restricted to tidewater,
American admiralty jurisdiction was defined so that it could grow
with the nation. Good reasons were expressed.
These lakes are in truth inland seas. Different States border on them
on one side, and a foreign nation on the other. A great and moving
commerce is carried on upon them between different states and a foreign
nation, which is subject to all the -incidents and hazards that attend
commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered on them, and
prizes been made; and every reason which existed for the grant of ad-
miralty jurisdiction to the general government on the Atlantic seas,
applies with equal force to the lakes. There is an equal necessity for the
instance and for the prize power of the admiralty court to administer
international law, and if the one cannot be established neither can the
other.7
The broad sweep of this decision did not go unchallenged. Mr. Jus-
tice McLean in dissent observed:
... for now it is insisted that any waters, however they may be within the
body of a State or country, are the peculiar province of the admiralty
power.... My opinions may be deemed to be contracted and antiquated,
unsuited to the day in which we live; but they are founded upon de-
liberate conviction as to the nature and objects of limited government,
and by myself at least cannot be disregarded .... I cannot construe the
constitution either by mere geographical considerations; cannot stretch
nor contract it in order to adapt it to such limits, but must interpret it
by my solemn convictions of the meaning of its terms, and by what is
believed to have been the understanding of those by whom it has been
formed."
Forty years later the full significance of the admiralty jurisdiction in
criminal matters was unfolded in United States v. Rodgers.9 A con-
gressional act made assault with a dangerous weapon a federal crime
when committed on the "high seas" outside the jurisdiction of a state.
Rodgers was validly tried and convicted in the federal court for an
act done while aboard a vessel in the Detroit River within the terri-
torial limits of Canada. Mr. Justice Field added further reasons for
including the Great Lakes waterway within federal maritime jurisdic-
tion:
The Great Lakes possess every essential characteristic of seas. They
are of large extent in length and breadth; they are navigable the whole
distance in either direction by the largest vessels known to commerce;
objects are not distinguishable from the opposite shores; they separate,
in many instances, States, and in some instances constitute the boundary
between independent nations; and their waters, after passing long dis-
tances, debauch into the ocean. The fact that their waters are fresh and
7. Id. at 453-54.
8. Id. at 465.
9. 150 U.S. 249 (1893).
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not subject to the tides, does not affect their essential character as seas.
Many seas are tideless, and the waters of some are saline only in a very
slight degree.'0
Two dissenting justices contended that "high seas" meant "open
seas." Numerous prior court decisions and international law litera-
ture were cited in support of this doctrine." One cannot deny that
the majority made a long leap forward, especially since this was a
criminal case where, traditionally, statutes are narrowly construed
and doubts are resolved in the accused's favor. The leap appears to
have been based upon practicality, not upon precedent.
Prior to Rodgers, it was held that federal criminal jurisdiction
did not encompass a felony - assault committed aboard a United
States excursion vessel - in the Detroit River on the American side.' 2
The applicable statute was the same statute as in Rodgers by which
jurisdiction was exercised over offenses committed on the high seas
or a river within the admiralty jurisdiction "out of the jurisdiction of
any particular state." Nevertheless, the court stated that the crime
occurred within Michigan waters and that Michigan had exclusive
criminal jurisdiction. The court did indicate, however, that:
The truth -is, an act of congress is greatly needed to extend our juris-
diction to crimes committed upon American vessels navigating the lakes
and their connecting waters. A vessel bound from Buffalo to Chicago,
touching at Cleveland, passes through the waters of six states, besides
those of the province of Ontario, and in her transit through the Detroit
and St. Clair rivers is crossing and recrossing the boundary line almost
every hour. While it may be entirely clear that a crime has been com-
mitted during the voyage, it may -be utterly impossible... to locate the
-time or place, and the offense goes unpunished, because there is no court
having -general jurisdiction of the voyage and of the vessel.la
In 1890, Congress responded to this appeal and granted federal
criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed on United States vessels
during voyages on the waters of the Great Lakes or connecting
waterways. 4
Federal criminal jurisdictional problems continued to plague
American vessels voyaging upon the Great Lakes. The indictment
had to be brought within the jurisdiction of the federal district court
in which the shipboard crime was committed." Furthermore, it was
not always easy to determine whether an American vessel was voyag-
ing on the Great Lakes. In Ex parte O'Hare"' a steam vessel was
being towed after winter anchorage for operational outfitting. The
10. Id. at 256.
11. Id. at 266-86.
12. Ex parte Byers, 32 Fed. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1887).
13. Id. at 410.
14. Act of Sept. 4, 1890, ch. 874, 26 Stat. 424.
15. United States v. Peterson, 64 Fed. 145 (E.D. Wis. 1894).
16. 179 Fed. 662 (2d Cir. 1910).
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vessel anchored within the breakwater of the port of Buffalo. No
crew was signed; no fires were in the boilers. The federal court re-
fused to exercise jurisdiction over an assault with a dangerous wea-
pon committed aboard the vessel. Since the vessel was not "on a
voyage," federal jurisdiction under the 1890 Act could not be in-
voked. Another possible ground for jurisdiction would have been
to construe the Great Lakes as "high seas" and the Buffalo break-
water area as a "haven" within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state." But
Rodgers, seventeen years before, had intimated that "high seas" jur-
isdiction with the "haven" appendage was not applicable to the Great
Lakes. The dissenting judge in the O'Hare case read the Rodgers,
opinion differently. He contended that the Great Lakes were withir
the "high seas" jurisdiction and that the sole question was whether
the Buffalo breakwater converted the ship's anchorage into a haven
exclusively within New York's jurisdiction. "Haven," the dissent
continued, meant a natural, not a man-made, protectorate. If the-
breakwater be destroyed by a storm, no "haven" would be left. Fed-
eral jurisdiction should not so easily be granted or withheld.17  Fur,
thermore,
the trend of decision in the federal courts has been steadily in favor
of widening the jurisdiction in admiralty; if we uphold the petitioner's
contention [no federal jurisdiction], it will, in my judgment, be a dis-
tinct step backwards. The facts in the present case illustrate how easy
it will be to hamper the commerce of the Great Lakes by lawless acts if
large sections of the high seas are to be removed from the jurisdiction
of the national courts. If the doctrine contended for be universally
adopted, it follows that not only on the Great Lakes, but on the ocean
as well, the section, where ships may anchor between a protecting wall
and the shore must be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, with constant clashing of authority which is sure to follow.
The commerce of the Great Lakes is not only national, but inter-
national in character and should be under the jurisdiction and protection
of the national courts.' 8
Current Rules
Today's federal statutory criminal jurisdiction remains basically
the same as it was in 1890. It is clear that a United States vessel on
voyage anywhere on the Great Lakes waterway outside United States
territory comes within the federal jurisdiction. 9 Foreign vessels are
not within the federal jurisdiction when voyaging within the Canad-
ian waters of the Great Lakes waterway. Foreign and domestic ves-
sels voyaging in American waters may well be considered on the "high
seas" from earlier judicial descriptions of the legal and geographical
17. Id. at 667-68.
18. Id. at 669.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 7(2) (1952).
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significance of the Great Lakes. All vessels within the breakwaters
of United States lake ports appear to be within the jurisdiction of a
particular state, and thereby outside federal criminal jurisdiction. 0
Congressional legislation may be necessary in order to cover with
federal jurisdiction vessels specifically within breakwaters of lake
ports. Perhaps the national legislature will not respond until a court
decision excludes from federal jurisdiction vessels in foreign com-
merce. 21 The federal constitutional interest in protection of foreign
sea commerce is obvious from the delegation of authority over for-
eign commerce in article I, section 8 and from the delegation of ad-
miralty jurisdiction in article III, section 2.
States bordering on the Great Lakes have little to fear from this
extension of federal criminal jurisdiction. Concurrent jurisdiction
can remain. Federal criminal statutes, in general, punish the same
antisocial acts as state statutes. Today, even if an act is not express-
ly made a crime by federal legislation, it may still be punished by the
Federal Assimilative Crimes Act.2 This statute provides that an act
made a crime by a state will be punished by federal prosecution when
committed within federal territory located within the state. Indi-
vidual states thereby gain protection from antisocial acts even when
committed in a federal jurisdiction within the state. For example, if
a person aboard a United States vessel on voyage from Chicago, Illi-
nois, to Michigan City, Indiana, committed an act of sodomy, the
federal district court could apply the Indiana sodomy law for an act
done on Indiana waters.23 The constitutionality of the Assimilative
Crimes Act, passed in 1948 to include state criminal laws enacted
subsequent to 1948, appears settled. 4
Even if later federal decisions should question the application of
the Assimilative Crimes Act in the Great Lakes maritime jurisdiction,
a state has concurrent jurisdiction and can enact laws to punish anti-
social acts of its citizen within the federal maritime jurisdiction where
the state law does not conflict with federal law. In Skiriotes v.
Florida,25 the state prohibited its citizens from using equipment to
take commercial sponges from the Gulf of Mexico, Straits of Florida,
and other state territorial waters. A federal law prohibited the tak-
ing of sponges under a certain size in waters outside the state terri-
tory. Defendant was lawfully convicted for violating the state law.
The United States Supreme Court emphasized:
20. 18 U.S.C. 5 7(1) (1952).
21. Compare the 1952 addition to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction provisions,
18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1952), to cover United States aircraft in flight over the high seas, passed
after a judicial decision, United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), had
denied such iurisdiction.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
23. United States v. Gill, 204 F.2d 740 (7th Cit. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825 (1953).
24. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
25. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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If the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the
high seas, we see no reasons why -the State of Florida may not likewise
govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to
matters in which the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no
conflict with acts of Congress. Save for the powers committed by the
Constitution to the Union, the State of Florida has retained the status
of a sovereign.. . .There is nothing novel in the doctrine that a State
may exercise its authority over its citizens on the high seas.26
Foreign Jessels
If points of conflict between federal and state criminal jurisdic-
tion can be deftly adjusted by the recognition of concurrent jurisdic-
tion supplemented by the Assimilative Crimes Act and state authority
over its own citizens, the matter of foreign vessels in local ports pre-
sents still more difficult challenges.
Once again, historical observations are worthy of note. In 1812,
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through
another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with
the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the
purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to
society, and would subject the laws -to continual infraction, and the gov-
ernment to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe
temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction
of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for
wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries
are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits.
Consequently there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of
this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are
found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, there-
fore, under which they enter can never be construed to grant such exemp-
tion.27
For purposes of criminal jurisdiction, foreign flag vessels in
Great Lakes ports are within state control primarily when serious
felonies are involved. Disorders aboard such vessels likely to disturb
the tranquility or public order on shore, or in the port, are concerns
of the state. In a New Jersey port an act of felonious homicide
aboard a Belgian vessel involving Belgian seamen gave rise to the
proper exercise of state criminal jurisdiction . 2  Even though a treaty
existed between the United States and Belgium granting full author-
ity over Belgian vessels to the Belgian consul, such acts involving
serious disturbances of the peace were interpreted not to fall within
the treaty provisions.
Fine distinctions covering the criminal acts which are the subject
26. Id. at 77.
27. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812).
28. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
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matter of local jurisdiction have been made. One court has held that
possession of illicit opium aboard a foreign vessel in a local port was
outside local jurisdiction, but a foreign seaman's smoking the opium
on the foreign vessel in port was within local jurisdiction.29 The
opinion acknowledged two opposing international law rules covering
such situations: the French rule, denying the exercise of local jurisdic-
tion unless the peace and security of the local port is threatened; and
the English rule, permitting the exercise of territorial jurisdiction
over crimes aboard foreign vessels in port.
The extreme situation was undoubtedly reached in Cunard S. S.
Co. v. Mellon0 when the United States Supreme Court upheld, as
constitutional, penalties against foreign vessels carrying liquor as sea
stores within United States ports. The prohibition amendment and
the Volstead Act had imposed this stringent rule. Mr. Justice Van
Devanter left no doubt concerning the complete subjection of foreign
vessels to local jurisdiction:
A merchant ship of one country voluntarily entering the territorial
limits of another subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the latter. The
jurisdiction attaches in virtue of her presence, just as with other objects
within -those limits. During her stay she is entitled to the protection of
the laws of the place and correlatively is bound to yield obedience to
them. Of course, the local sovereign may out of considerations of public
policy choose to forego the exertion of its jurisdiction or to exert the
same in only a limited way, but this is a matter resting solely in its
discretion 31
The opinion then reaffirmed the words of Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall pronounced over a century before - words which adopt
the ultimate in the territorial jurisdiction principle:
The jurisdiction of -the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
-itself ....
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within -its territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.32
The Supreme Court in the Cunard S. S. Co. case did not speak
with unanimity, however. In dissent, Mr. Justice Sutherland cau-
tioned:
The general rule of international law is that a foreign ship is so far
identified with the country to which it belongs that its internal affairs,
whose effect is confined to the ship, ordinarily are not subjected to
interference at the hands of another state in whose ports it is temporarily
present.33
29. People v. Wong Cheng, 46 P.I. 729 (1922).
30. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
31. Id. at 124.
32. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
33. 262 U.S. 100, 132 (1923) (dissent).
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The dissent then urged that the Volstead Act should not be in-
terpreted to violate the principles of international comity. Mere
possession of liquor in sea stores on foreign vessels in American ports
should be deemed outside the statutory regulations. To construe the
statute to avoid conflict with international law, the dissent also ap-
plied the wisdom of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall who had urged:
... an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains .... 34
The United States has recognized the major interest the flag
sovereign has over its vessel in a foreign port. Even in the most
serious criminal incident the United States has acknowledged the
subordinate jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign over criminal acts
committed aboard the foreign vessel while in the port of the terri-
torial sovereign. Within its discretion, the territorial sovereign may
acquiesce and permit the exercise of the foreign sovereign's jurisdic-
tion.
The United States exercised jurisdiction over the case of a mur-
der of an American committed by an American aboard an American
vessel located 250 miles up the Congo River.35 The United States
Supreme Court, speaking unanimously through Mr. Justice Stone,
stated:
There is not entire agreement among nations or the writers on inter-
national law as to which sovereignty should yield to the other when thejurisdiction is asserted by both.... The position of the United States ...
has -been that at least in the cases of major crimes, affecting the peace
and tranquility of the port, the jurisdiction asserted by the sovereignty
of the port must -prevail over that of the vessel .... In the absence of
any controlling treaty provision, and any assertion of jurisdiction 'by the
territorial sovereign, it is the duty of the courts of the United States to
apply to offenses committed by its citizens on vessels flying its flag, its
own statutes, interpreted in the light of recognized principles of inter-
national law.
3 6
The jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign over its vessels in Great
Lakes ports is undoubtedly secondary to the territorial jurisdiction.
Especially is this true for major crimes committed aboard foreign
vessels in lake ports. An act not considered a breach of public order
and tranquility in a coastal port might well be considered a breach in
Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, or Chicago. Perhaps more important
than the fact that the Great Lakes are considered seas, is the fact
that they are inland. The waters are completely dominated by the
territorial boundaries of both states and provinces as well as the Un-
ion and the Dominion. The test of practicality may well demand
more territorial jurisdiction over crimes. Judicial decisions, aided by
34. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
35. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
36. Id. at 158-59.
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legislative enactments,-7 will undoubtedly adapt and mold such juris-
dictional issues in the years to come as the common-law process seeks
to meet the jurisdictional needs of the Great Lakes.
FEDERAL AND STATE CRIMES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Once the thorny jurisdictional issue is resolved with the territorial
sovereign - federal or state - authorized to prosecute, the selec-
tion of the prosecuting authority raises interesting problems. Even
between two sovereignties with the same legal traditions, such as the
United States and Ohio, important differences appear. Both sover-
eigns have declined to accept common-law crimes ;38 both are exclu-
sively statutory crime jurisdictions. The traditional crimes are often
defined quite differently when two different legislatures enact laws to
punish the same crime. A comparative analysis of several of these
crimes will accent the dissimilarities between the federal crime and
the same Ohio crime. Significant differences are emphasized.
ARSON
United States Code 9  Ohio Revised Code4"
1. a. Willfully and maliciously set fire 1. a. Willfully and maliciously or with
-to or burn or attempt to set fire intent to defraud set fire to or
to or burn. burn.
b. Any building, vwssel, machinery b. Any building.
building supplies, military stores.
c. Not more than $1,000 fine nor c. 1-10 years imprisonment.
more than 5 years imprisonment,
or 'both.
2. a. If a dwelling beset fire orburned 2. a. Dwelling house or parcel be-
or a life be placed in jeopardy. longing thereto.
b. Not more than $5,000 nor more b. 2-20 years.
than 20 years, or both.
Ohio has enacted additional arson crimes: burning personal prop-
erty or aiding the burning of such property willfully and with the in-
tent to defraud or injure the insurer (one to five years) ;4" willfully
and maliciously burning or aiding in burning personal property of an-
other valued at $25 or more (one to three years). While the fed-
eral arson statute includes attempts to burn, Ohio has enacted a spe-
cial attempt provision (not more than $1,000 or one to two years).43
37. For example the 103d General Assembly of Ohio (1959) enacted Am. S.B. 350 ex-
tending the jurisdiction of the Cleveland and Eudid Municipal Courts three miles into Lake
Erie. Gov. DiSalle signed this legislation.
38. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); Vanvalkenburg
v. State, 11 Ohio 404 (1842).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 81 (1952).
40. OHIO REv. CODE § 2907.02 and .03.
41. Omo REV. CODE § 2907.04.
42. OHio REv. CODE § 2907.05.
43. Otno REv. CoDE § 2907.06.
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The Ohio enactment also seeks to define an attempt: placing or dis-
tributing combustible materials or any device at any property in an
arrangement or preparation with the intent eventually to willfully
and maliciously set fire thereto.
ASSAULT
United States Code4
1. a. Assault with intent to commit
murder or rape.
b. Not more than 20 years im-
prisonment.
2. a. Assault with dangerous weapon
with intent to do bodily harm
without just cause.
b. Not more than $1,000 nor more
than 5 years, or both.
3. a. Assault ,by striking, beating or
wounding.
b. Not more than $500 nor more
than 6 months, or -both.
4. a. Simple assault.
b. Not more than $300 nor more
-than 3 months, or 'both.
Ohio Revised Code
1. a. Assault with intent to kill, rob
or rape.
b. 1-15 years imprisonment.45
2. a. Maliciously shoot, stab, cut or
shoot at another with intent to
kill, wound or maim.
b. 1-20 years.4 6
3. a. Assault with dangerous weapon,
instrument, other means or force
likely to kill or to do great
'bodily harm.
b. 1-5 years.47
4. a. Assault, strike, wound, threaten
in menacing manner.
b. Not more than $200 nor more
than 6 months. 48
The federal code section set out above also provides for an as-
sault with intent to commit a felony other than murder or rape (not
more than $3,000 nor more than ten years, or both). Ohio covers
this area only partially by including robbery within its felonious as-
sault statute as indicated above. Both jurisdictions include maiming
as a crime with surprisingly similar provisions.49 The punishment
differs greatly, however. The federal crime demands not more than
$1,000 nor more than seven years, or both. The punishment in Ohio
is three to thirty years and, if one throws acid to disfigure another,
imprisonment for life is permissible.
FALSE PRETENSES
United States Code50  Ohio Revised Code51
1. a. By fraud or false pretense obtain 1. a. By false pretense and intent to de-
anything of value, or procure exe- fraud, obtain anything of value,
cution or delivery of conveyance or procure signature of another
of realty or personalty, or signa- on evidence of indebtedness, or
ture of person on evidence of in- sell or dispose of promissory in-
44. 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1952).
45. OHIO REv. CODE 2901.24.
46. OHIo REy. CODE § 2901.23.
47. OHIo REv. CODE § 2901.241.
48. OHIo REv. CODE § 2901.25.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 114 (1952) and OHIo REV. CODE § 2901.19.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1025 (1952).
51. OHIo REV. CODE § 2911.01.
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debtedness, or sell or dispose of
promissory instrument knowing
it to be worthless or knowing sig-
nature of maker, endorser or
guarantor obtained -by false pre-
tense.
b. If value obtained more than $100,
not more than $5,000 fine nor
more than 5 years, or both; if
$100 or less, not more .than $1,000
fine nor more than 1 year, or
both.
strument knowing signature of
maker, indorser or guarantor ob-
tained by false pretense.
b. If value obtained $60 or more,
1-3 years; if less, not more than
$300 nor more than 90 days, or
both.
Ohio's larceny by trick statute 2 permits easier prosecutions in the
twilight zone involving the issue of whether only possession passed
or both title and possession passed as the result of misrepresentation.
The federal code lacks this convenient traditional crime.
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE
United States Codes
1. a. Unlawful killing of a human be-
ing with malice aforethought; if
perpetrated by poison, lying in
wait, any other kind of willful,
deliberate, malicious, and pre-
meditated killing or in perpe-
trating or attempting arson, rape,
burglary, robbery, or with pre-
meditated design unlawfully to
effect the death of another.
b. Death unless jury qualifies with-
out capital punishment, then life
imprisonment.
Ohio Re'ised Code54
1. a. Parposely and either with de-
liberate and premeditated malice,
or with -poison, or in perpetrat-
ing or attempting rape, arson,
robbery, burglary.
b. Death unless jury recommends
mercy, then life imprisonment.
Ohio requires a purposeful killing, an intent to kill, in every first
degree murder, plus premeditated malice or poison or the perpetra-
tion of one of the four serious felonies or their attempt.55 The fed-
eral statute follows the common-law definition of murder which re-
quires only malice aforethought, not an intent to kill.55 Showing an
intent to kill can be one independent means of proving such malice,
as can the use of poison, lying in wait, or killing in the four serious
felony incidents.57 Even in a killing during the commission of one
of the four serious felonies, Ohio requires an intent to kill; the fed-
eral law does not.
52. Omo REv. CODE § 2907.21.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1952).
54. OHIO REv. CODE § 2901.01.
55. Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857); Turk v. State, 48 Ohio App. 489, 194 N.E.
425 (1934), ajf'd, 129 Ohio St. 245, 194 N.E. 453 (1935); State v. Salter, 149 Ohio St. 264,
78 NX.E.2d 575 (1948); State v. Farmer, 156 Ohio St. 214, 102 NXE.2d 11 (1951).
56. United States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851 (C.C. Ark. 1890).
57. Ornelas v. United States, 236 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1956).
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MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE
United States Code" Ohio Revised Code5 9
1. a. Unlawful killing of a human be- 1. a. Purposely and maliciously kill an-
ing with malice aforethought by other.
other than those means expressed
as murder first degree.
b. Any term of years or life im- b. Life imprisonment.
prisonment.




1. a. Unlawfully killing without mal-
ice: Voluntary - upon sudden
quarrel or heat of passion;
Involuntary - while commit-
ting an unlawful act not a felony,
or committing a lawful act in an
unlawful manner or without due
caution which might produce
death.
b. Voluntary - not more than 10
years; Involuntary - not more
than $1,000 nor 3 years, or both.
Ohio Revised Code62
1. a. Unlawfully kill another.
b. 1-20 years.
Judicial decisions in Ohio have filled in the simple statutory defi-
nition. Killing in a sudden quarrel and heat of passion is manslaugh-
ter, 3 as it is in the federal jurisdiction. But contrary to the federal
statute, a killing must be committed during an unlawful act which
constitutes a violation of a state statute. An act considered a crime
at common law but not by statute, or an act of gross or culpable negli-
gence, does not give rise to manslaughter. 64  A violation of a city
ordinance also satisfies the requirement of an unlawful act.65 The
federal statute's provision of causal relation must also be met in
Ohio.6"
RAPE
United States Code6 7
1. a. Commit rape.
Ohio Revised Code68
I. a. Carnal knowledge of any female
forcibly and against her will.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1952).
59. OHio REv. CODE § 2901.05.
60. Ornelas v. United States, 236 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1956).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1952).
62. Omo REv. CODE § 2901.06.
63. State v. Laswell, 78 Ohio App. 202, 66 N.E.2d 555 (1946).
64. Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 63 N.E. 607 (1902).
65. State v. O'Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N.E. 885 (1922).
66. State v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1952).
68. OHio REv. CODE § 2905.01.
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b. Death or imprisonment for any
term of years or life.
b. 3-20 years.
, The simplicity of the federal enactment requires much judicial in-
terpretation. Common-law precedents have been the source of the
needed definitions.69 Ohio has expressly enacted the common-law
crime with the exception that carnal knowledge is complete upon pene-
tration without the common-law requisite of emission.70
STATUTORY RAPE
United States Code7 '
1. a. Carnally know any female not
one's wife under 16 years of age.
b. First offense not more than 15
years imprisonment; subsequent
offense not more than 30 years.
Ohio Revised Code72
1. a. A person 18 years or older car-
nally knows a female under 16
wvith her consent.
b. 1-20 years, or 6 months in county
jail. Court may hear testimony
in mitigation or aggravation of
sentence.
The age limitation of the male assailant is a crucial difference
between the Ohio and federal crimes. Ohio provides an additional
crime of rape of a female under twelve forcibly and against her will.
Life imprisonment is imposed.7 3 This provision would appear to be
more similar to the federal offense.
ROBBERY
United States Code74
1. a. By force and violence, or intimi-
dation take from the person or
presence of another anything of
value.
b. Not more than 15 years imprison-
ment.
Ohio Revised Code75
1. a. By force or violence or putting
in fear steal from the .person of
another anything of value.
b. 1-25 years.
Both Ohio and federal robbery statutes are practically identical,
especially with Ohio judicial decisions interpreting "to steal from the
person" to include not only his body but also his presence.76 Ohio
does provide additional protection to society with an armed robbery
statute imposing ten to twenty-five years imprisonment when a pistol,
knife, or dangerous weapon is used.7 7
69. Oliver v. United States, 230 Fed. 971 (9th Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 670
(1916).
70. Omo Ra. CODE § 2905.05.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2032 (1952).
72. OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.03.
73. OHio REv. CODE § 2905.02.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (1952).
75. OHio Ray. CODE § 2901.12.
76. Turner v. State, 1 Ohio St. 422 (1853).
77. OHio Ray. CODE § 2901.13.
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THEFT OR LARCENY
United States Code78
1. a. Take and carry away with intent
to steal or purloin any personal
property of another.
b. If the value exceeds $100 or if
taken from the person of an-
other, not more than $5,000 nor
5 years imprisonment, or both;
all other cases not more than
$1,000 nor 1 year, or both.
Ohio Revised Code79
1. a. Steal anything of value.
b. If the value is $60 or more, 1-7
years; if the value is less than
$60, not more than $300 fine or
90 days, or both.
In both jurisdictions the judiciary has recognized these statutory
crimes as enactments of the common-law offenses.80 While the fed-
eral statute covers pocket picking in the punishment provision, Ohio
has adopted a specific statute for this crime.8' An evidence of debt
or other written instrument containing a sum thereon shall be con-
sidered to be the value as represented by the sum, the federal act pro-
vides. Ohio incorporates the same rule in the definitions chapter of
the Revised Code. 2
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
United States Codees
1. a. To buy, receive or conceal any-
thing feloniously taken, stolen or
embezzled from another knowing
it to have been taken, stolen or
embezzled.
b. Not more than $1,000 nor more
than 3 years imprisonment, or
both; if the value does not ex-
ceed $100, not more than $1,000
nor more than 1 year, or both.
Ohio Revised Code8 4
1. a. Buy, receive or conceal anything
stolen, taken by robbers, em-
bezzled or obtained by false pre-
tense, knowing it to have
been stolen, taken by robbers,
embezzled or obtained by false
pretense.
b. If value is $60 or more, 1-7
years; if value less than $60, not
more than $300 nor more than
90 days, or both.
The gist of this offense is the personal knowledge of the accused
that the goods received are stolen. A subjective test is demanded un-
der Ohio and federal law. 5 It is interesting to note that the federal
crime includes embezzled goods even though the federal criminal
code does not include embezzlement as a crime when committed with-
78. 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1952).
79. OHio REv. CODE § 2907.20.
80. Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St. 166 (1873); see Dunaway v. United States, 170 F.2d 11
(10th Cir. 1948).
81. OHIO REV. CODE § 2907.29.
82. OHIO REV. CODE § 1.07.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 662 (1952).
84. OHIO REv. CODE § 2907.30.
85. Morris v. State, 8 Ohio App. 27 (1917); Peterson v. United States, 213 Fed. 920 (9th
Cir. 1914).
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in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. The federal crime
of embezzlement covers only goods in interstate or foreign com-
merce."' Not the maritime jurisdiction under article III of the
United States Constitution, but the subject matter of interstate and
foreign commerce under article I, is the source of federal jurisdiction
over the offense of embezzlement. Despite this fact, the maritime
jurisdiction includes the use of the receiver's statute for embezzled
property.
Another major difference between federal crimes and Ohio
crimes lies in the conspiracy area. The federal code includes a gen-
eral conspiracy statute:
If two or more persons conspire... to commit any offense against the
United States ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy ...
each is subjected to a maximum $10,000 fine or five years imprison-
ment, or both. 7  Ohio has no such general conspiracy statute.88
However, the Ohio criminal code does include specific conspiracy
provisions for the crimes of abducting and kidnaping (five to thirty
years imprisonment) .'9 For this crime the state definition of con-
spiracy is quite similar to the federal definition. The same holds
true for Ohio's conspiracy to defraud the state (not less than one
year nor more than two years imprisonment, nor more than $5,000
fine, or both).9o However, the Ohio crime of convicts conspiring to
kill a prison guard requires three or more participants and no express
requirement exists that one or more do an act to achieve the objective
of the conspiracy. This crime is punished by not less than one nor
more than twenty years imprisonment in addition to the existing sen:
tence. 9'
The federal general conspiracy statute eliminated the need for
most specific conspiracy crimes. Retained in the United States Code,
however, are several specific provisions: to injure the free exercise
or enjoyment of a federal constitutional right ;92 to defraud the gov-
ernment with respect to claims ;93 to impede or injure a federal offi-
cer ;94 to procure the escape of a prisoner of war;95 to gather or to
86. 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1952).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952).
88. H.B. 424 of the 103d General Assembly of Ohio (1959) was a general conspiracy
proposal but it failed to pass.
89. OHIo REv. CODE § 2901.34.
90. OHMO REV. CODE § 2921.14 (Supp. 1958).
91. OHio R1v. CoDE § 2901.03 (Supp. 1958).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1952).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 286 (1952).
94. 18 U.S.C. 5 372 (1952).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 757 (1952).
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deliver defense information to aid a foreign government;96 to injure
property of a foreign government ;97 to transport in interstate or for-
eign commerce a kidnaped person;98 to destroy any vessel;9' to over-
throw the government of the United States by force; 100 and to make
false reports to interfere with military and naval operations. 1 1
The further impact of these several differences between federal
and Ohio statutory crimes will be considered under the later subject
of problems in prosecution.
CRIMES INVOLVING SEA COMMERCE
The federal constitution provides two sources of authority for
protection of sea commerce: the jurisdictional grant of article III
covering all admiralty and maritime cases and the legislative author-
ity in article I to define felonies on high seas. Originally, the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among states was an
unknown constitutional quantity.
Experience with admiralty and maritime cases, however, had ex-
isted in colonial days with the establishment of vice admiralty courts
in the colonies followed by state admiralty courts between 1776-1789.
In the later years of this period appeals could be taken from the
state admiralty courts to a court of appeals set up by Congress under
the Articles of Confederation. 2 The Continental Congress also had
exclusive authority to define felonies committed on the high seas, a
power inherited from the British Sovereign upon independence. 0 3
The commerce clause authority, in contrast, was first introduced
in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.10 Its operation remained
quiescent for several decades. Not until judicial decisions firmly
grasped and molded this authority did it become what it is today.
Gibbons v. Ogden,'05 decided in 1824, and Brown v. Maryland,0 0 de-
cided three years later, interpreting the scope of interstate and for-
eign commerce respectively, introduced this clause as the primary
fountainhead of federal power in peacetime and a major authority
to restrict state power in the balancing of federal-state relations.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V, 1952).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 956 (1952).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1952).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2271 (1952).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (Supp. V, 1952).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1952).
102. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMmucA 572-73 (Corwin ed., rev. and
ann., 1952).
103. Id. at 277.
104. Id. at 118.
105. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
106. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
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Protection of sea commerce from crimes has been achieved by
utilizing the admiralty and maritime clause as well as the commerce
clause.
The net of crimes within the special territorial and maritime jur-
isdiction includes, in addition to the traditional crimes discussed pre-
viously, certain other crimes oriented to sea commerce specifically.
The owner of a vessel within the maritime jurisdiction who willfully
destroys the vessel in whole or in part may be punished with life im-
prisonment or any term of years10 7 if the act is accompanied by an
intent to injure the underwriter, or any merchant with goods aboard,
or any other owner of the vessel. A nonowner of a vessel willfully
destroying or attempting to destroy the vessel to which he belongs,
within the maritime jurisdiction, may be imprisoned for not more
than ten years.08
Ohio's general statute prohibiting the malicious destruction or in-
jury of property applies only to nonowners. If the value of the prop-
erty destroyed is $100 or more, the penalty is one to seven years im-
prisonment; otherwise, a $500 fine or thirty days, or both, is the
maximum. 0
One further federal maritime crime of significance is the break-
ing and entering of a vessel with the intent to commit a felony, or the
malicious destruction of any cable, rope, or fast fixed to the anchor
or moorings belonging to any vessel." A fine of not more than
$1,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, can
be imposed.
Ohio's statutes for breaking and entering refer to ships in only
two instances: (1) nighttime breaking and entering a ship or water-
craft in which a person resides to commit or attempt to commit per-
sonal violence, or armed with a dangerous weapon, indicating a vio-
lent intention,"' and (2) daytime breaking and entering a similar
vessel to commit or attempt to commit personal violence." 2  Both
offenses are misdemeanors and the maximum penalty is $300 fine or
thirty days in jail for the former, and $100 fine or twenty days for
the latter. Of course, burglary of an uninhabited dwelling with one
to fifteen years punishment, which includes railway cars, warehouses,
or other buildings, will include dock terminals and enclosed
wharves." The possession of burglary tools with the intent to use
them burglariously to force buildings or other places where goods are
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2272 (1952).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2273 (1952).
109. Omo Rxv. CODE 5 2909.01.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2276 (1952).
111. Omo REV. CODE § 2907.16.
112. OHio REV. CODE 5 2907.17.
113. OHio REV. CODE § 2907.10.
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kept is also punishable by one to five years imprisonment. How-
ever, proof of specific intent is required.. 4
It is also a federal offense willfully to cause or to permit the de-
struction or injury of a foreign or domestic vessel, or knowingly to
permit the use of such vessel as a place of "resort" for any person
conspiring with another or preparing to commit any offense against
the United States or its obligations, or to defraud the United States.
The maximum penalty is $10,000 fine or ten years imprisonment, or
both." 5 If the vessel is so used with the knowledge of the owner,
master, or one in command, the vessel with all equipment is liable to
seizure and forfeiture to the United States.
Criminal legislation grounded upon congressional authority to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce emphasizes the protection
of the goods which are the subjects of sea commerce and the vessels
which are the means of sea commerce. To set fire to any vessel en-
gaged in foreign commerce or to its cargo, or to tamper with the in-
struments of navigation or motive power, is punishable by a fine of
not more than $10,000 or twenty years imprisonment, or both." 6 To
transport goods in interstate or foreign commerce, or to receive, con-
ceal, or dispose of goods which constitute interstate or foreign com-
merce, knowing them to have been stolen, converted, or taken by
fraud, subjects one to a $10,000 maximum fine or not more than ten
years imprisonment, or both.1 7  In interpreting these valuable statu-
tory provisions for protection of goods in sea commerce it is wise to
remember that judicial decisions do not require that the statutes be
interpreted strictly upon technical common-law definitions of lar-
ceny." 8
One final public safety enactment worthy of mention covers the
intentional interfering with, or attempting to interfere with the ex-
portation to foreign countries of American articles. Injury to such
articles by fire or explosives while in foreign commerce permits a
maximum penalty of $10,000 or twenty years imprisonment, or
both." 9
114. OHIo REv. CODE § 2907.11.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2274 (1952).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2275 (1952).
117. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 (Supp. V, 1952), 2315 (1952).
118. Bergman v. United States, 253 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1958). In United States v. Turley,
352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957), the Supreme Court, interpreted "stolen" in the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. 5 2312 (1952), a companion enactment to the Interstate Trans-
portation of Stolen Goods Act. "Stolen . . . includes all felonious takings of motor vehicles
with intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or
not the theft constitutes common law larceny." An act considered embezzlement, not larceny,
at common law is included within the word "stolen."
119. 18 U.S.C. 5 1364 (1952).
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In the specific protection of property involved in sea commerce,
the federal authority carries the major share of responsibility.
NARCOTIC TRAFFIC
To the average citizen the first thought stimulated by the subject,
"crime and the seaway," focuses upon dope smuggling. Sinister ad-
venture stories have emphasized seaports as gateways for the illicit
traffic. In truth, there is a challenge to seaport communities to pre-
vent increased narcotic traffic. The Middle East and Red China are
primary sources of illegal drugs. Complete customs control over do-
mestic and foreign crews and passengers is often difficult to achieve.
A small package - four pounds - easily concealed on a member of
a ship's crew can provide handsome profits. The narcotics traffic is
business to many persons: the crew member, the importer who "cuts"
the four pounds slightly, the wholesaler who buys two pounds and
"cuts" it by 50 per cent, the distributor who procures twelve ounces
and "cuts" again, and the peddler who buys a few ounces and "cuts"
it heavily to sell to the addict. Obviously, the jugular vein of law
enforcement is located at the docks and wharves. To protect this
vein laws must be effectively applied. Because it is a business, the
risks involved must be measured by the severity of punishment and
the facility of conviction. Legislation is vital for the prevention of
this criminal traffic.
Both the United States and Ohio have effective narcotics statutes.
Interestingly, neither jurisdiction includes the drug traffic crimes un-
der the criminal code. The federal provisions appear under the in-
ternal revenue and the food and drug codes. Ohio has placed its
narcotics legislation under the title of health, safety, and morals.
United States Code
1. a. Tax on importers, manufacturers,
producers, wholesale and retail
dealers, physicians and other
practitioners, persons engaged in
research who handle narcotics.
b. Registration of all persons han-
dling narcotics.
c. Unlawful for person required to
register to import, manufacture,
produce, compound, sell, dis-
pense, distribute, administer, or
give away without registering or
paying tax.
Ohio Re'ised Code
1. a. Licensing of manufacturers,
wholesalers, pharmacists with
regulations for sale; regulations
and records for dispensing by
pharmacists and practitioners.
b. No one other than licensed per-
son shall possess or have under
control narcotic drug unless ob-
tained by prescription and still in
original container; possession is
p1resumptive evidence of viola-
tion.
c. The penalties vary. For exam-
ple, the penalty for (b) is: first
offense, not more than $10,000
and 2-15 years imprisonment;
second offense, not more than
$10,000 and 5-20 years; third
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offense, not more than $10,000
and 10-30 years.'2 3
d. Unlawful for any unregistered
person to transport narcotic
drugs from one state to another.
e. Unlawful for any unregistered
person to possess or control nar-
cotic drugs; possession or control
is presumptive evidence of vio-
lation.12 0
f. First offense, not more than
$20,000 and 2-10 years impris-
onment; second offense, not
more than $20,000 and 5-20
years; third and subsequent of-
fenses, not more than $20,000
and 10-40 years. Suspended
sentence or probation prohibited
beginning with second offense.' 2 1
2. a. Unlawful to import or bring into 2. [No similar Ohio provision.]
United States any narcotic drugs
except as prescribed by Com-
missioner of Narcotics.
b. Unlawful for any person fraudu-
lently or knowingly to import or
bring any narcotic drug into
United States contrary to law, or
to receive, conceal, buy, sell, or
to facilitate transportation, con-
cealment or sale of such narcotic
drug after imported or brought
in, knowing the same to have
'been imported or brought in, or
conspire to commit any of such
acts.
c. First offense, 5-20 years impris-
onment and in addition may be
fined up to $20,000; second or
subsequent offense, 10-40 years
and in addition may be fined up
to $20,000.
d. Possession is sufficient evidence
to authorize conviction unless de-
fendant explains to satisfaction
of jury.122
3. a. Anyone 18 years or older know- 3. a. Unlawfully dispense or adminis-
ingly sells, gives away, furnishes, ter narcotic drug to minor.
or dispenses or facilitates the
same, or conspires to do so, any
120. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 4721, 4722, 4724.
121. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7237 (a).
122. 43 Star. 657 (1936), 21 U.S.C. 5 173 (1952); 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C. § 174
(Supp. V, 1952).
123. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3719.02, .04, .05, .06, .07, .09, .16; OHIo REv. CODE 55
3719.021, .171, .99 (Supp. 1958).
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heroin unlawfully imported or
brought in, to anyone under 18
years.
b. Not more than $20,000 and life,
or not less than 10 years, or
death if the jury directs.
c. Possession of heroin is sufficient
proof that it was unlawfully im-
ported or brought in, unless de-
fendant explains to jury's satis-
faction. 2 4
b. 30 years to life.'2 5
c. Induce or attempt to induce an-
other to use unlawfully a narcotic
drug; use a minor to transport,
carry or produce unlawfully a
narcotic drug; induce or attempt
to induce a minor to violate nar-
cotic laws; induce or attempt to
induce a minor to use narcotic
drug except in accordance with
prescription.
d. First offense, 10-25 years; sec-
ond offense 25-50 years.' 2 6
4. a. Sell a narcotic drug except as
prescribed by law.
b. 20-40 years.' 27
5. a. Knowingly permit use of build-
ing, vehicle, boat, aircraft; or any
other place owned or controlled,
for illegal keeping, dispensing
or administering.
b. First offense, not more than $500
or 1-5 years; each subsequent
offense $200-$1000 or 1-5
years.
128
6. a. Possess for sale except as pre-
scribed by law. Conspire with
another person or persons: to
induce another to use unlawfully,
to dispense unlawfully to a minor,
to employ a minor to carry un-
lawfully, to induce a minor to
violate narcotics law, knowingly
to use a building or vehicle to
keep, dispense or administer nar-
cotics illegally.
b. First offense, 10-20 years; second
offense, 15-30 years; third of-
fense, 20-40 years.'29
7. Burden of proof for any exemp-
tion, excuse, proviso or exception
rests on defendant; prosecution
need not negative any of these
issues. 3 0
124. 70 Stat. 571 (1956), 21 U.S.C. § 176(b) (Supp. V, 1952).
125. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 3719.20(D), .99(G) (Supp. 1958).
126. OHio Rv. COE §§ 3719.20(C), (E), (F), (G), .99(E) (Supp. 1958).
127. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3719.20 (B), .99(F) (Supp. 1958).
128. OHIO REV. CODE § 3719.10; OHIO REV. CODE § 3719.99(B) (Supp. 1958).
129. ORIo REv. CODE §§ 3719.20(A), (H), .99(D) (Supp. 1958).
130. OHIO R-v. CODE § 3719.22.
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With the advanced legislation to control narcotic drugs enacted
by Ohio in 1955, adequate statutory resources are available to pro-
hibit illicit drug traffic. Moreover, the enforcement agencies of both
the federal and Ohio governments have express legislative authority
to cooperate with each other in law enforcement procedures against
illegal narcotic drugs.'
PROBLEMS OF PROSECUTION
Criminal law becomes viable upon prosecution. In the practical
reality of a criminal trial the legal process will adjust to the needs of
the community.
As an example, let us assume that the Cleveland police are alerted
to a homicide aboard a freighter of a foreign flag. Upon investiga-
tion these facts are revealed: the deceased was killed five to eight
hours prior to discovery of his body; the vessel had traveled from
Canadian waters to Cleveland; it had crossed the international boun-
dary about seven hours before this discovery; and it had entered
port, Cleveland's harbor, five and a half hours before the body was
found. The authority to investigate rests in either federal or local
agents. The customary cooperation between two law enforcement
agencies takes place. Facts are gathered indicating K committed the
killing while robbing the deceased.
In the prosecution of K for murder, proof of the elements of the
crime differ between the federal and Ohio statutes.'32 It has already
been noted that Ohio demands proof of an intent to kill, even though
a robbery was committed. Federal law defines murder as an unlaw-
ful killing while perpetrating robbery. Since federal law does not re-
quire proof of intent to kill, it would appear that a federal conviction
could be obtained more easily than an Ohio conviction.
However, suppose that certain criminal evidence was obtained by
an illegal search and seizure. Without it, conviction would be ques-
tionable. Federal judicial decisions decree that the fruits of such un-
constitutional action cannot be introduced in criminal trials.3 3 Ohio,
however, permits the use of illegally seized evidence in criminal pro-
ceedings. 3 The United States Supreme Court condones the state
rule even though it prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence in
federal trials. 13' However, the federal courts will not go so far as
to allow a federal officer to be a witness in a state court to introduce
illegally seized evidence. Federal courts will enjoin the federal offi-
131. 70 Stat. 575 (1956), 21 U.S.C. 5 198 (Supp. V, 1952); OHIo REv. CODE § 3719.18.
132. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
133. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
134. State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936), overruling Nicholas v. City
of Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N.E. 26 (1932) and Browning v. City of Cleveland, 126
Ohio St. 285, 185 N.E. 55 (1933).
135. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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cer as a witness in a state criminal trial under such conditions.1386 The
federal prosecutor is hindered by the more restrictive evidentiary rule
applying to illegally seized evidence.
Or assume that when federal authorities arrested K for murder
in the special admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, they failed to bring
him promptly before a federal commissioner. The purpose of the
delay was solely to obtain K's confession. K provided the confession
without duress, fraud, or promise. Under a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, this confession is illegally obtained, and the
use of it to convict K constitutes reversible error.137 Ohio courts do
not apply such a stringent rule. Confessions are barred only when
not given voluntarily.' 3 They are not rendered inadmissible in Ohio
merely by reason of delay in the arraignment.' 9 The confession is
the quintessence of criminal evidence. To obtain an admissible con-
fession is much more difficult under the federal rule than under the
Ohio rule.
Similar differences between federal and Ohio criminal trials occur
in the area of presumption of the accused's innocence and his right to
remain silent. The crux of this issue revolves around the significance
of the accused's refusal to take the stand in his defense. The federal
court charges the jury that the accused is presumed innocent and no
consideration can be given to his failure to take the stand. 140 The
district attorney cannot comment on this unwillingness. Although
Ohio courts emphasize the presumption of innocence, the constitution
expressly states: "failure to testify may be considered by the court
and jury and may be the subject of comment by counsel.' ' 14' For
practical purposes when the prosecutor, standing before the jury in
final argument, points his accusing finger and says, "If this man be
innocent, why doesn't he take the stand under oath and assert his
innocence," the impact on the jury is obvious. And when the trial
judge directs the jury to presume the accused's innocence but adds
that his failure to testify may be considered by the jurors in determin-
ing guilt or innocence, the psychological effect on the decision-makers
is strong.
State prosecutors in Ohio are often in a less favorable position
than federal district attorneys, however, because federal judges may
express an opinion on the weight of the evidence and the credibility
136. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
137. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
138. State v. Yeoman, 112 Ohio St. 214, 147 N.E. 3 (1925).
139. State v. Lowder, 79 Ohio App. 237, 72 N.E.2d 785 (1946). Appeal dismissed for
want of a debatable constitutional question, 147 Ohio St. 530, 72 N.E.2d 102 (1947).
140. Kowalchuk v. United States, 176 F.2d 873 (6th Cir. 1949).
141. Omo CONST. art. I, § 10.
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of witnesses. 42 Federal judges are not merely moderators at the
trial but governors of the trial; they may assist the jury in arriving
at their conclusion.143  Ohio trial judges are restricted from such
comment. They are mere moderators and umpires, not governors. 144
In the trial of a criminal case, the words and conduct of a judge can
be influential.'45
Whether to prosecute K, an accused murderer, in the federal or
Ohio courts must be decided in the light of these legal practicalities.
Recent developments in the area of double jeopardy ease the bur-
den of both federal and state prosecuting officials in questionable
areas involving who should initiate the prosecution. If an accused is
convicted under state law he can be tried and convicted under federal
law for the same incident without violating the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment.'46 Also, if an accused is acquitted in
a federal trial, he can be tried and convicted under state law for the
same incident without violating the fifth amendment or the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.147
The Ohio Supreme Court has extended the doctrine of multiple
prosecution to its ultimate. It is not unconstitutional under the Ohio
constitution for the same act (illegal transportation of intoxicating
liquors) to be punishable separately under federal, state, and munici-
pal governments if each sovereign has a separate law punishing such
offense. 4 '
Different rules exist regarding the necessity for indictment by a
grand jury. If the federal authorities arrest for a felony violation,
the person charged may waive indictment by the grand jury and pro-
ceed directly to trial. 49  When Ohio authorities arrest a person for
a felony, the state constitution requires an indictment by the grand
jury before he can be tried. 5 ' Grand juries are one step where the
citizen jurors reflect community attitudes toward crimes as well as
law enforcement officers. Such juries can occasionally be strong pro-
tectors of persons charged erroneously or with weak evidence. This
practical consideration cannot be ignored.
142. Petro v. United States, 210 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 and
347 U.S. 978 (1954); United States v. Aaron, 190 F.2d 144 (2d Cit. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 827 (1951).
143. Lovely v. United States, 175 F.2d 312 (4th Cit. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 834
(1949).
144. For a comparison between the Ohio rule and federal rule see 39 OHIO JuR., Trial §§
292-95 (1935).
145. See Logan v. Cleveland Ry., 107 Ohio St. 211, 218-19, 140 N.E. 652, 654 (1923);
Hazen v. Morrison & Snodgrass Co., 14 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 483 (1911).
146. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (conspiracy crime).
147. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (bank robbery).
148. State v. Shimman, 122 Ohio St. 522, 172 N.E. 367 (1930).
149. FED. R. CRiM. P. 7 (b).
150. Art. I, § 10. S.B. 51 of the 103d General Assembly of Ohio (1959) permitting waiver
of indictment by an accused was passed. Gov. DiSalle signed this legislation.
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Of more significance to an accused in federal or state prosecu-
tions is representation by counsel. Both the federal' 5 ' and Ohio'52
constitutions expressly require such representation. The judge must
supply counsel for the indigent accused in both jurisdictions. But in
the federal court no provision has been made to pay for legal services,
while in Ohio courts the defense counsel receive legal fees at the
state's expense. While the ethical responsibility of lawyers to re-
spond to the judicial call for adequate criminal defense of the indi-
gent is acknowledged and performed, the practical value of legal fees
paid by the governmental authority or private charitable organiza-
tions should not be overlooked.-13
In those areas of criminal jurisdiction where federal and state
authority to prosecute is congruent, and thus may be exercised con-
currently, the wisdom of a cautious approach to the question of which
sovereign should prosecute is apparent. A high degree of coopera-
tion between federal district attorneys and state prosecutors will in-
evitably be forthcoming to handle seaway crimes. Also, law enforce-
ment agencies of both jurisdictions will discover the necessity of simi-
lar cooperation in this area of criminal law.
CONCLUSION
Criminal justice represents an endless process of human adjust-
ment to society's needs. The goals of this process remain constant:
to protect life, limb, and property by maintaining a peaceful and
orderly community in which men can live, work, and create. The
tools, however, change as man's community changes: jurisdictional
rules, criminal laws, and prosecution practices will reflect the needs
of a Great Lakes Seaway region. Seaway transportation with all its
marketing assets, an abundant water supply so vital to industry, and
a heavy concentration of productive and creative people will require
unparalleled social and economic adjustments for this area. While
the purposes of criminal law will remain the same, the tools will un-
doubtedly be altered. jurists, lawyers, legislators, and police - at
both the federal and state levels - will have an opportunity in the
years to come to recast these legal tools.
With vision of the Great Lakes region which is to be, with faith
in the common-law tradition of legal growth, and with dedication to
the solution of today's challenges in criminal justice, this new chapter
of human development shall be one of prosperity for the community
and of peace for the individual.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. GRIM. P. 44.
152. OHIO CoNST. art. I, § 10; In re Motz, 100 Ohio App. 296, 136 N.E.2d 430 (1955).
153. Cross, 'The Assistance of Counsel for his Defence". Is This Becoming a Meaningless
Guarantee, 38 A.B.AJ. 995 (1952); BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL 212-21 (1955).
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